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the statute or the case law required the subterranean stream follow the
exact flow of the channel. The court held that as long as the subterranean stream flowed in the same general direction as the channel it
would suffice to meet the test and the directional deviation would be
irrelevant. The Board noted that the channel which runs beneath the
wells deviated from flowing parallel to the subterranean stream when it
hit the less permeable clay sediments near the wells, which forced the
streamflow into more permeable soils. The Board argued that the divergence of the groundwater flow was consistent with the general
downstream flow of the subterranean stream. The court found this
explanation to be adequate to explain the perpendicular flow.
Finally, NGWC argued that the four-part test be replaced with the
classifications found in 1911 treatise authored by Samuel C. Wiel,
Wiel stated that known underground streams were rare and the presumption was against their
presence. The court found that the pre-1913 case law distinguished
subterranean streams as a subclass of underground streams, which
when looked at together failed to support NGWC's claims. The court
held that the four-part test was consistent with the language and objective of the statute and that substantial evidence supported the Board's
findings. The court also found that NGWC waived the issue of the
Boards application of the original permit when it failed to raise it in
1999. The court then noted that even if NCWC had timely raised the
issue, it would not be persuasive because courts extend considerable
deference to an administrative agency's explanation of its own regulations and language.
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
the Board accurately interpreted a statute to determine whether
groundwater fell within the Boards permitting authority.
Kathleen Brady
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES.

COLORADO
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Meadow Island Ditch Co. No. 2, 132 P.3d
333 (Colo. 2006) (holding that the recipient of a contractuallydelivered water right may not change its use without the consent of the
appropriative owner and that a plan for augmentation does not violate
a contractual prohibition against changing the point of diversion for a
subject water).
The Public Service Company of Colorado ("PSCo") derived its water rights in the subject water through its 46.25% ownership in the
Beeman Ditch and Milling Company ("Beeman"). Meadow Island
Ditch Company No. 2 ("Meadow") and Beeman, under a 1905 decree,
shared a head-gate on the South Platte River, where each diverts its
respective water rights. In 1925, a dispute arose between Meadow and
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an organization representing Beeman, Consolidated Ditches Company
of District No. 2 ("Consolidated"). That same year, Consolidated and
Meadow reached a settlement, the Consolidated/Meadow agreement,
which limited Meadow's draft of water to 40 c.f.s. and prohibited
changing the point of diversion for Meadow water.
Also in 1925, Beeman and Meadow entered into a separate agreement, the Beeman/Meadow agreement, which incorporated the terms
of the above 1925 agreement, and further specified that Meadow
would deliver its water in excess of 40 c.f.s. to Beeman. Furthermore,
Beeman owned 12 of the 90 outstanding shares of Meadow. Thus,
Beeman, and therefore PSCo, had an interest in Meadow's excess water as well as an interest in the 40 c.f.s. which Meadow normally diverts.
As a shareholder in Beeman, the above 1925 agreements give PSCo
a pro-rata interest in both the excess water and the 12/90ths water.
However, the agreements only give PSCo a contractual right to
Meadow's excess water. PSCo does not have an ownership right in this
excess water as it is a contractually-delivered right governed by the
1925 agreements. Conversely, PSCo's interest in the 12/90ths water is
an adjudicated water right.
On July 31, 2002, PSCo applied for a change of water rights and
sought approval of a plan for augmentation. Meadow objected to
PSCo's application and proposed plan. Meadow argued that PSCo did
not own the water rights, but rather had a contractual right to receive
the subject water. Additionally, Meadow argued that the agreements
under which PSCo claimed its water rights were unambiguous and expressly prohibited PSCo from changing the point of diversion for
Meadow water.
The District Court for Water Division No. 1 issued a pre-trial order
holding that PSCo could not change the use of the excess water under
the controlling 1925 agreements. The water court also issued a posttrial order approving PSCo's plan for augmentation, as these same
agreements did not bar PSCo from using its subject water to augment
out-of-priority diversions. In an appeal by PSCo, challenging the water
court's Pre-Trial Order, and a cross-appeal by Meadow challenging the
water court's Post-Trial Order, the Colorado Supreme Court considered the scope of water rights governed by the two 1925 agreements.
Regarding PSCo's appeal, the court looked to the 1925 contractual
grant to use the adjudicated water right to determine whether PSCo
may change the use of the water. The Beeman/Meadow agreement is
silent regarding whether Meadow granted the right to change the use
of the subject water to Beeman, and thus to PSCo. The agreement's
silence permitting or prohibiting any change of use of the excess water
did not allow for an implied grant to change this use. Instead, the
court interpreted the absence of such language to do the opposite.
Because PSCo's contractually-delivered water right was different than a
water right acquired by original appropriation, diversion, and applica-
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tion to beneficial use, the court declined to interpret the contract's
silence as granting PSCo the right to change the use of the water.
The court concluded that the rights represented by the 1925 Beeman/Meadow agreement were not water rights with statutory right to
change use. The court noted that the 1925 agreements had a single
intent, which was to limit Meadow's diversions to 40 c.f.s. The court
viewed PSCo as a consumer, whose rights were determined by the
terms of its contract. Meadow had retained ownership of its water
rights, and the contract had not bargained for a change in the use of
Meadow's excess water. Thus, the court held that the holder of a contractually-delivered water right, PSCo, may not change its use without
the consent of the appropriative owner, Meadow.
Regarding Meadow's cross-appeal, the court examined the contractual restriction on PSCo's adjudicated water right to determine
whether PSCo may operate its proposed plan for augmentation without violating the 1925 agreements. The 1925 agreements maintain a
prohibition on changing the point diversion of the subject water.
PSCo's plan for augmentation would not change the point of diversion
and provided for continued use of the South Platte River head-gate.
Further, PSCo's plan allowed use of the 12/90ths share of water as replacement water to satisfy holders of vested rights. The court noted
that out-of-priority diversions, such as the one proposed by PSCo, were
not contemplated by the parties at the time of the 1925 agreements,
because the legislature had not yet authorized such a use.
The court concluded PSCo's plan for augmentation did not involve
changing the diversion points for the subject water. Rather, the proposed plan and subject water replaced the water diverted from upstream wells. Additionally, PSCo performed the proper water law procedures and quantified and limited the planned augmentation so
Meadow's water right did not exceed 40 c.f.s. This effectuated the intent of the 1925 agreements as it did not allow for an enlargement of
Meadow's water rights. Thus, the court held that PSCo's plan for
augmentation furthered the intent of the original 1925 agreements
and did not violate the agreements' prohibition on changing the point
of diversion for the subject water.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the water court.
The 1925 Beeman/Meadow agreement was silent on change of use
and there was no evidence of a bargain for this change of use. The
court stated that PSCo's right was a contractually-delivered right, and
as such it may not change the use of its water without the consent of
Meadow. Additionally, the court affirmed PSCo's plan for augmentation reasoning that the point of diversion was not changed; the 1925
agreements did not contemplate the out-of-priority diversions; and the
proposed plan did not violate the intent of the original agreements.
David Riddle

